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Notes
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.:
Taking the Teeth Out of
Proportionality Review
I.

INTRODUCTION

The 1980s unleashed an unprecedented wave of hostile takeovers
spurred by the proliferation of junk bonds and the widespread use
of leveraged financing techniques.I This frenzied merger activity
forced many companies to adopt takeover defenses to deflate their
takeover attractiveness. The courts that evaluated the validity of
these defensive measures struggled to find a standard by which to
review these actions. The Delaware judiciary, the reigning authority of corporate law,2 stepped forward and created the "proportionality standard of review."' 3 Proportionality review requires a court
to make a threshold determination-that the takeover defense is
reasonable in relation to the threat posed-before it applies the
business judgment rule to the directors' decision to implement the
defense."
As the takeover decade ended, however, it was unclear how
much power the Delaware Supreme Court would pack into its new
standard of review.' Court observers questioned whether the new
standard of review would be a powerful constraint on defensive
measures or a weak justification of defensive actions. 6 In Paramount Communications,Inc., v. Time Inc. ,7 the Delaware Supreme
1.

INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER, STATE

TAKEOVER LAWS

1

(1989) [hereinafter IRRC].

2.

See Meyers, Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, INSTITU-

TIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1989, at 64.
3. See Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.
1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch.

1986).
4. See infra notes 25-67 and accompanying text.
5. Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standardfor Defensive Tactics.: Is
There Substance to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 251 (1989).

6.

Id.

7.

571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
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Court was asked to decide whether Time's restructuring of a proposed merger with Warner Communication, Inc.-a defensive maneuver designed to preclude Time's shareholders from accepting a
tender offer from Paramount-was a reasonable response in relation to any threat posed by the Paramount offer. The court upheld
the defensive technique, and in the process, pulled the teeth out of
proportionality review.
This Note traces the development of the business judgment rule
and examines its evolution into proportionality review. This Note
then discusses Paramount,summarizing the relevant facts of the
case and the court's opinion. The court's opinion is then analyzed,
focusing on three points: (1) the proper definition of a "threat" in
proportionality review; (2) whether the court incorrectly applied
the business judgment rule at the threshold level of analysis; and
(3) whether the court should have recognized the shareholders' interest in choosing their own fate. Finally, the Note discusses Paramount's negative impact on Time's shareholders and the
shareholders of all companies faced with a hostile, but lucrative,
tender offer.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Business Judgment Rule
A corporation's board of directors has a fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of the corporation's stockholders.' The business
judgment rule presumes that directors' actions comport with this
duty.9 The rule protects disinterested directors from incurring liability for a poor business decision if the directors acted on an informed basis and with an honest belief that the decision was in the
company's best interest.' 0 The rule's rationale derives from the
Delaware General Corporation Law," which grants the board of
directors broad powers of corporate governance.' 2 By applying
this rule, "a court [avoids] substitut[ing] its judgment for that of
8. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1988).
9. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The business judgment rule is a
"presumption that in making a business decision the directors of the corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the best interest of the company." Id. (citing
Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil
Refinery Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 A. 46 (1924)).
10. Id.
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-398 (1987).
12. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v.
Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). The Delaware Corporation Act provides: "the
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in
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the board of directors if the [board's] decision can be 'attributed to
any rational business purpose.' "3 Therefore, a company's directors will not be held liable for a harmful business decision unless it
is established that the directors were acting for personal benefit or
did not have a rational basis for their decision.
The business judgment rule is the main protection for directors
facing liability for their corporate decisions. The Delaware
Supreme Court has held that this rule also should protect directors
from incurring liability for deciding to invoke certain takeover defenses.' 4 The court views the defensive decision as it would any
other board decision and, thus, presumes that it is made in the
shareholder's best interests.'I Legal scholars and practitioners,
however, have debated over how much deference the court should
give to directors when reviewing the directors' defensive actions.' 6
this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1987).
13. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
14. See Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 627. In Pogostin, stockholders of City Investing Company (City) brought a derivative suit charging City's board with wrongfully rejecting a
tender offer for City's shares. This rejection allegedly caused City's shareholders to lose a
premium over market value. Id. at 622. The court held that the business judgment rule
was applicable in the context of a takeover; therefore, the directors' decision could not be
questioned. Id. at 627 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984);
Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974).
15. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
16. See Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S.CAL. L. REV. 65, 66 n.7 (1989). Professor
Loewenstein classifies the debates over the directors' role in takeover bids into three categories: (1) the passive role, allowing for maximization of shareholder wealth; (2) the
auctioneer's role, encouraging an auction of the target's shares at the highest possible
price; and (3) the active role, giving the directors great deference in deciding how to
respond to a hostile offer. Id.
The argument in favor of director passivity is based on the premise that directors must
always operate to maximize shareholder wealth. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.1161
(1981). This argument states that shareholder welfare is not increased when defensive
tactics defeat a takeover, thereby forcing shareholders to forego a control premium. Id.
at 1164. Rather, shareholder welfare is maximized by considering the market value of
the stock if the offer is not successful, the price of successful future tender offers, and the
probable occurrence of one of these two events. Id.
Professor Gilson and Lucian Bebchuk argue that shareholder wealth in a takeover
situation is best maximized if the target management assumes an auctioneer's role. See
Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35
STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982); Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in
Tender Offer Defenses, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982).
The final position argues that the directors' broad power of corporate governance
requires the court to grant corporate directors great deference in implementing takeover
defenses. See Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One
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The Delaware Supreme Court also has recognized that takeover
bids present a caveat to a board's traditionally unfettered discretionary exercise of its business judgment.1 7 The court, however,
has struggled to develop a standard by which to review such
actions.
Cheff v. Mathes' 8 offered the Delaware Supreme Court one of its
first opportunities to review a defensive action.19 In Cheff, the
court focused on the directors' motives in deciding whether the
business judgment rule protected the directors' takeover defense.20
The court stated that the business judgment rule protects directors'
defensive actions if the directors prove that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that another person's stock ownership
threatened corporate policy and effectiveness.2" The directors satisfied this burden of proof by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation into the threat presented by the new stockholder.22
Cheffs implicit message was that target managers need to find only
a policy conflict with the would-be acquirer to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule. 23 Because it is very easy to docYear, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroonv A
Response to ProfessorsEasterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1231 (1980); Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
17. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court recognized
that the takeover situation entails an "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting in
its own interests rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders." Id. Therefore, the court held that "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination
at the threshold before the protection of the business judgment rule may be conferred."
Id. For a complete discussion of Unocal, see infra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
18. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
19. In Cheff, a reputed corporate liquidator, Maremont, acquired a controlling interest in Holland Furnace Co. Id. at 499, 199 A.2d at 551. Holland's directors offered to
buy out Maremont's interest in Holland at an above-market price. Id at 502, 199 A.2d
at 553. A group of Holland's shareholders challenged the board's action as an improper
use of corporate funds. Id. The Delaware Court of Chancery found the directors liable
because the purpose behind the transaction was the perpetuation of control of incumbent
management. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that its review of the record led:
inevitably to the conclusion that the board of directors, based upon direct investigation, receipt of professional advice, and personal observations of the contradictory action of Maremont and his explanation of corporate purpose, believed,
with justification, that there was a reasonable threat to the continued existence
of Holland, or at least existence in its present form, by the plan of Maremont to
continue building up his stock holdings.
Id. Therefore, the court held that the directors' decision was protected by the business
judgment rule. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at 556-57.
20. See id. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555. Some commentators call the Cheff test the "conflict/primary purpose" test. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 249.
21. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 506, 199 A.2d at 555.
22. Id.
23. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 249-50.
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ument such a policy conflict, the Cheff test boiled down to a
routine application of the business judgment rule broadly protecting defensive actions.24
B. ProportionalityReview
1. Development of the Standard in Unocal
The Cheff approach was criticized widely for giving directors
unrestrained freedom to defeat takeover attempts. 25 The Delaware
Supreme Court recognized Cheffs deficiencies and reconsidered its
implications in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 26 In Unocal,
Mesa 27 offered to purchase 37% of Unocal's stock to gain control
of the company.28 Mesa indicated that if its tender offer were successful, it would cash-out the nontendering shares for highly
subordinated bonds. 29 Thus, Unocal's shareholders would be coerced into tendering their shares to Mesa to avoid receiving the
worthless bonds."a Unocal countered with its own offer to repurchase all of the company's shares at a higher price than offered by
Mesa. 3 ' The terms of Unocal's offer, however, precluded Mesa
from tendering its Unocal shares back to Unocal. 32 Mesa challenged Unocal's power to engage in any defensive measure, especially a selective repurchase program. a
In deciding the case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
Unocal's defensive measure would be protected by the business
judgment rule only if it were "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed."' 34 The court recognized Cheffs rationale, but held that
24. Id.
25. Id at 250; see also Bebchuk, The Case ForFacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers,
95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target
Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 1161 (1981); Gilson, A Structural
Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN.
L. REV. 81 (1981); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
26. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
27. Mesa is the Arizona shell corporation of the well known corporate raider, T.
Boone Pickens. Id. at 949 n. 1.
28. Id. at 949. Mesa acquired 13% of Unocal's stock before making the offer. Id.
29. Id. at 949-50. Unocal labeled the securities to be received in the second part of
the deal as "junk bonds." Id. at 950.
30. This is the classic two-tier, front-end-loaded, coercive tender offer. For a discussion of the two-tier offer, see Newell Co. v. Vermont Am. Corp., 725 F. Supp. 351, 372
(N.D. Ill.
1989) and Lederman, Tender Offer Bidding Strategy, 17 REV. SEC. REG. 917
(1983).
31. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 955.
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before applying the business judgment rule to a defensive action,
the court first must consider the reasonableness of the defensive
measure in relation to the threat posed by the hostile
tender offer. 5
36
Thus, the court created proportionality review.
Using this newly established rule, the court embarked upon a
two-part analysis: (1) to define the threat presented by the tender
offer, and (2) to examine the reasonableness of Unocal's defensive
action in relation to that threat. The court found that Mesa's offer
constituted a threat because it was a "grossly inadequate two-tier
coercive tender offer coupled with the threat of greenmail. ' ' 37 The
court also found Unocal's repurchase program reasonable because
the program ensured that minority shareholders were receiving
equivalent value for the stock that they held prior to the tender
offer. 38 The selective repurchase aspect of Unocal's tender offer
35. Id.
36. This standard of review is also known as "intermediate review." See Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 5, at 250-51. This title apparently derives from the options that
were available to the court when it reformulated the Cheff standard. The court could
have adopted a less deferential standard that emphasized the shareholders' interest in
deciding whether the tender offer should be accepted or rejected. Alternatively, the court
could have adopted a very deferential standard similar to Cheff. The court accepted an
intermediate standard, thereby attempting to distinguish defensive tactics designed to entrench management from those tactics designed to benefit shareholders. Id.; see Unocal,
493 A.2d at 956.
Judge William Duffy summarized proportionality review in the following five part test:
(1) the board must show reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness exists; (2) the board must show that it actedin good faith; (3) the
board must show that it made a reasonable investigation; (4) the majority of the board
must consist of independent outside directors; and (5) the board's defensive action must
be reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co.,
558 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 1988).
37. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. In defining what may constitute a threat, the court held
that directors may analyze the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate
enterprise considering the following factors: "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of the security being offered in the
exchange." Id. at 955 (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors
Responsibility: An Update, A.B.A. NAT'L INST. ON DYNAMICS CORP. CONTROL, Dec.
8, 1983, at 7).
"Greenmail" refers to prevention of a takeover by having the target purchase its shares
back from the would-be acquirer at a premium that is not available to other shareholders.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 n.13.
38. Unocal, 493 A.2d 956; see also Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch.
293, 306, 93 A.2d 107, 114 (1952) (fairness of merger depends upon whether minority
shareholders receive the substantial equivalent in value of what [they] had before"),
quoted in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985).
In Unocal, the court held that this principle of fairness is also applicable to a tender
offer. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57. Unocal's minority shareholders, forced to accept the
junk bonds if Mesa's offer were successful, would have received securities worth less than
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was also reasonable because Mesa's participation in the offer would
have undermined its purpose.39
In Unocal, the court recognized that takeover targets do not
"have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means." 4 The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently
applied this new standard to review shareholder rights repurchase
plans in Moran v. Household International,
Inc.41 and Revlon, Inc.
42
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.

2. Fine Tuning the Unocal Threats
In the late 1980s, the Delaware Chancery Court attempted to
solidify the intermediacy of proportionality review by constraining
the definition of threat.43 In City Capital Associates v. Interco
Inc.," the Delaware Court of Chancery reviewed whether Interco's
the value of their shares. Id. at 957. By offering to purchase these shares, Unocal ensured that the minority shareholders would receive equal value for their shares. Id.
39. The board's objective in enacting the selective exchange offer was twofold: (1)
defeat the inadequate Mesa offer, or (2) provide valuable securities to the minority shareholders who otherwise would have been forced to accept junk bonds. Unocal, 493 A.2d
at 956. Allowing Mesa to participate in the offer would have subsidized Mesa's continuing effort to buy Unocal stock. Id. at 955.
40. Id.
41. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on
Unocal to invoke the business judgment rule to protect a board of directors decision to
implement a preferred share purchase rights plan - also known as a "poison pill" - as a
defensive mechanism. Id. at 1348, 1350.
42. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, the court evaluated the validity of two
defensive measures implemented by Revlon to thwart a hostile takeover attempt by Pantry Pride, Inc. Revlon's first defensive measure was a poison pill. Id at 180; see supra
note 41. Relying on Moran, the court held that the board had the power to adopt such a
measure. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180. The court also found the poison pill to be reasonable
in light of the grossly inadequate Pantry Pride offer. Id. Additionally, Revlon offered to
repurchase ten million of its outstanding shares in exchange for senior subordinated
notes. Id. at 177. The court also found this action to be reasonable in relation to the
threat posed by the Pantry Pride offer and, thus, protected by the business judgment rule.
Id. at 181. These defensive measures, however, did not dissuade Pantry Pride from its
takeover attempt, and it continued to increase the price of its per share offer. Id at 182.
Accordingly, the court concluded that the break-up of Revlon was inevitable and that the
duty of Revlon's board "changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to
the maximization of the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit." Id.
43. In City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796-98 (Del. Ch. 1988) and
Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1056-58 (Del. Ch. 1988), the
chancery court refused to uphold defensive measures because the circumstances of each
case did not create an adequate threat to survive a Unocal analysis. See supra notes 26-42
and accompanying text. The chancery court also concentrated upon the reasonableness
aspect of the Unocal test to strike down defensive actions in AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 1986) and Robert M. Bass
Group, Inc. v. Evans, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,924
(Del. Ch. 1988).
44. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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directors breached their fiduciary duty to Interco's shareholders by
maintaining a poison pill4" designed to defeat a noncoercive tender
offer. The tender offer was for all of Interco's outstanding shares at
$74 per share conditioned upon removal of the poison pill. 46 Interco's board rejected this offer as inadequate, left the poison pill in
place, and adopted a restructuring plan with a claimed value of at
least $76 per share. 47 By maintaining the poison pill, the board
precluded Interco's shareholders from choosing between these two
alternatives.
The court, applying the Unocal test, held that the poison pill was
not a reasonable defense in relation to the threat posed, because the
tender offer did not threaten shareholder interests. 48 The court
held that only two types of tender offers can threaten shareholder
interests: (1) coercive offers, 49 and (2) noncoercive but inadequately priced offers. 50 The offer in Interco was obviously noncoercive, but the board argued that it was inadequate because its per
share price was comparatively low in relation to the value of a proposed restructuring plan."1
The court concluded that, when faced with an inadequate offer,
the business judgment rule allowed Interco's board temporarily to
leave the poison pill in place while taking steps to protect shareholder interests as the offer developed.52 Once this period ended,
however, the poison pill no longer protected shareholder inter45. The poison pill adopted by Interco's board was a shareholders rights plan containing both "flip-in" and "flip-over" rights. Id at 791. The flip-in provision allowed
each right holder to purchase a share of the company's stock with a market value of twice
the exercise price of the right. Id This right was triggered if any person obtained 15% of
Interco's outstanding common stock. Id The flip-over provision allowed right holders
to purchase the common stock of an acquiring company. This stock would have twice
the value of the exercise price of the right. Id. at 791-92. This right was triggered by a
merger or acquisition of 50% or more of Interco's assets or earning power. Id at 792.
46. Id at 793.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 797-800.
49. The most extreme case of a coercive offer is the two-tiered front-end-loaded offer
such as was used in Unocal. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
50. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797. The court held that noncoercive offers can threaten
shareholder interests because an active negotiator may be able to achieve a more valuable
proposal or arrange an alternative transaction. Id. at 798. See also, e.g., CFRT v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
Shareholders Litig., 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
51. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792-93.
52. Id. at 798. Such steps include, but are not limited to, negotiating with the offeror
on behalf of the shareholders, proceeding with a Revlon-style auction, or recapitalizing or
restructuring of the company. Id. For a discussion of the Revlon auction, see supra note
42.
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ests.53 Allowing the poison pill to remain in place at the final stage
of the noncoercive offer, therefore, precluded the shareholders
from exercising their own independent judgment about their own
interests.54 The court recognized that "a shareholder could prefer
a $74 [per share] cash payment now to the complex future consideration offered through the restructuring. '" 55 The court declared
that the claimed threat of inadequate value was "too mild" to justify maintaining the poison pill.56 Thus, the board's action did not
pass the Unocal threshold and did not merit the business judgment
rule's protection.
The Delaware Court of Chancery strengthened Interco's rationale in Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co. "I In Grand
Metropolitan, Pillsbury enacted a poison pill and other defensive
measures as preemptive defenses against any future, unforeseen
takeover attempts. 59 More than two years after Pillsbury adopted
this defensive stance, Grand Metropolitan (Grand Met) made an
all-cash offer for all of Pillsbury's outstanding shares, conditioned
upon removal of the poison pill.6° Pillsbury's board refused to remove the poison pill, claiming that Grand Met's offer was inadequate and not in the best interest of the company. 6' By
maintaining the poison pill, Pillsbury's shareholders were precluded from accepting Grand Met's offer to buy Pillsbury stock at
approximately a 60% premium over the market price.62
Grand Met argued that the Pillsbury directors' actions violated
fundamental rules of corporate governance and democracy because
board members must act as fiduciaries on behalf of the stockhold53. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 799.
56. Id at 798. Specifically, the court stated:
To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation of 'poison
pills' to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or
create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders' behalf, would, it
seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of
our corporation law.
Id. at 799-800.
57. Id.
58. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988). The Grand Metro. opinion was authored by the
retired Delaware Supreme Court Justice William Duffy sitting by assignment under
DEL. CONST. art. IV and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5610 (1987).
59. Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1051.
60. Id. at 1052.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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ers.6 3 The court accepted this argument and, citing Interco, ruled
that Pillsbury's shareholders should be allowed to make an informed choice. 64 The court held that Pillsbury's claimed threats of
inadequate value and coercion were not substantial enough to jusactions
tify maintenance of the poison pill. 65 Thus, the directors'
6
were not protected by the business judgment rule.
Interco and GrandMetropolitan strengthened proportionality review by limiting the types of threats that would justify defensive
actions. It appeared that this standard remedied the defects of the
Cheff standard. The Delaware Supreme Court, however, rejected
these chancery court opinions in Paramount and, thus, reduced
proportionality review to mere rhetoric.
III.

PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS, INC. V. TIME INC. 6 7

A.

Factual Background

In 1987, Time Inc. (Time) established a special committee of
executives to consider expanding Time's operations into the entertainment field.6" This committee eventually recommended a
merger with Warner Communication, Inc. (Warner), and the two
companies agreed to merge by 1989.69 The merger was to be executed by a stock swap between the two companies. 70 This transaction required the approval of both Time and Warner
63. Id. at 1053.
64. Id. at 1060.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
68. Id. at 1143. Time is a Delaware corporation with its principle offices in New
York City. Although the company's main business is publishing books and magazines, it
also provides pay television programming through its Home Box Office and Cinemax
subsidiaries. Id.
69. Id. at 1144-46. A planned merger with Warner was abandoned in late 1987 for
tax reasons. Id The merger contested in the Delaware courts arose from a board meeting on July 21, 1988. Id at 1145. At that meeting, management reported that it had
reviewed many entertainment companies, including Paramount, as merger candidates.
The board decided that Warner was the most desirable company with which it should
merge for the following reasons: (1) the success of the Warner movie studios, Warner
Brothers; (2) the synergy between Warner's and Time's cable operations; (3) Warner's
music business; and (4) Warner's international distribution. Paramount Communications, Inc., v. Time Inc., No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (WESTLAW, States library,
DE-CS file).
70. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1146. Under the agreement, Warner would merge into a
wholly owned Time subsidiary from which Warner would become the surviving corporation. Id. Warner's common stock would then be converted into Time stock at the
agreed-upon ratio. Id. Time's name would then be changed to Time-Warner, Inc. Id.
The stock exchange ratio eventually agreed upon by the parties was .465 in favor of
Warner. Id. At the time of the merger, the market exchange rate was .38 in favor of
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shareholders.7
The Time-Warner merger was suddenly postponed on June 7,
1989, when movie industry competitor Paramount Communications, Inc. (Paramount) made an all-cash tender for 100% of
Time's outstanding shares.72 Paramount's $175 per share offer was
considerably higher than the $126 per share price at which the
stock was trading during the period immediately preceding the offer.73 The offer, however, was conditioned on Time abandoning its
planned merger with Warner. 74 Time's board rejected Paramount's initial offer as inadequate.75 Paramount then raised its offer to $200 per share. 76 The second offer also was formallyrejected
by Time's board. The board reasoned that the Warner merger offered greater long-term value for the stockholders.77 Time's board
also stated that Paramount presented a threat to Time's survival
and corporate culture.78
Time responded to Paramount's offer by restructuring the
Warner deal from a stock swap to "an outright cash and securities
acquisition of Warner. '7 9 By restructuring the deal to a cash acquisition, Time eliminated the need for stockholder approval because it no longer needed to issue new stock. The down side of the
restructuring was that Time was forced to take on seven to ten
billion dollars worth of debt to finance the acquisition., 0 The restructuring of the deal effectively forced Time's shareholders to
forego a large cash buy-out of their interests in favor of a deal that
would strap their company with a tremendous debt load. Paramount and a group of Time shareholders challenged the action of
Time's board and asked the Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin
Warner. Id. Time's board decided to pay a premium over the market rate to compensate
for Warner's recent rapid growth and to protect the "Time Culture." Id.
71. Id. The rules of the New York Stock Exchange required Time's shareholders to
approve the transaction because Time needed to issue a large amount of new shares. Id.
Warner's shareholders also had to approve the transaction under the Delaware General
Corporation Law. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1987).
72. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1147.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1148. Time's financial advisors declared that the firm's value on an auction
basis was materially higher than the value of Paramount's per share offer. Id.
76. Id. at 1149. This offer was made on June 23, 1989. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1148. Under the restructured deal, Time would make an all-cash offer to
purchase 51% of Warner's outstanding shares for $70 per share. Id. The remaining 49%
of the shares would be purchased later for a mixture of cash and securities worth $70 per
share. Id.
80. Id.
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the Time-Warner merger."' The chancery court denied this request for relief holding that Time's merger restructuring was a reasonable response in relation to the threat posed by the Paramount
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor's
offer.82 The
83
decision.
B.

Delaware Supreme Court Opinion

In reviewing the chancellor's decision, the Delaware Supreme
Court divided its analysis into three segments. First, the court
considered whether Time put itself up for sale by entering into the
proposed merger with Warner, thus invoking Revlon duties.8 Second, the court examined the validity of the chancellor's conclusion
that the business judgment rule protected Time's original decision
to enter into the Warner merger. 85 Finally, the court analyzed
whether the board's defensive measure of restructuring the 8deal
6
satisfied the proportionality review test established in Unocal.
The court found that the Time-Warner merger did not invoke
Revlon duties.87 Additionally, the court concluded that the busi81. Id. at 1141-42. The claims of Paramount and the individual shareholders were
filed separately and consolidated by the chancellor. Id. at 1142.
82. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., No. 10866 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989) (WESTLAW, States library, DE-CS file). The chancellor's unpublished memorandum opinion discusses the definition of a Unocal threat. The chancellor recognized that
Interco and GrandMetro. established a rule of law that an all-cash, all-shares tender offer
falling within a certain range of values cannot be a justifiable Unocal threat if the offer is
not deceptive and will promptly be followed by a second-step merger for cash. Id. at 62.
The chancellor then distinguished Time's merger plan from the poison pills in Interco and
Grand Metro. and refused to enjoin Time's action. Contrary to the situation in Interco
and Grand Metro., the chancellor found that Time's management was not trying to force
Time's shareholders to accept the Warner merger as the "functional equivalent" of the
Paramount offer. Id at 64. The chancellor also found that, although Time's action was
in reaction to the Paramount offer, it was grounded in "bona fide strategic business planning, and not in questions of corporate control." Id. at 63. The chancellor concluded
that the corporation had a legally cognizable interest in achieving the planned merger
with Warner and had established a valid Unocal threat. Id.
83. The Delaware Supreme Court orally affirmed the chancellor's decision on July
24, 1989. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989). The
Delaware Supreme Court's written opinion was issued on February 26, 1990 and revised
on March 9, 1990. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989).
84. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150. For a discussion of Revlon duties, see infra note
87.
85. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1151.
86. Id. at 1152. For a discussion of Paramount's application of Unocal, see infra
notes 90-106 and accompanying text.
87. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1151. In Revlon, the court held that, when a breakup of
a company becomes inevitable, the duty of the board changes from preservation of the
corporate entity to maximization of shareholder wealth. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
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ness judgment rule protected the board's decision to merge with
Warner. 88 After disposing of these issues, the court examined
whether Unocal was the proper standard of review for the case.
The court summarily dismissed this issue by declaring that the
chancellor's decision to apply Unocal was clearly correct and undisputed.89 The court then applied the Unocal test to the facts of
the case and questioned whether the board's response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Paramount's offer.
Paramount and the Time shareholders argued that the restructuring of the Warner deal failed the Unocal test because Paramount's offer did not constitute a valid threat. 90 Paramount relied
on the Delaware Court of Chancery cases which held that all-cash
tender offers within a certain range of values cannot constitute a
legally recognizable threat to shareholder interest sufficient to
withstand a Unocal analysis. 91 Accordingly, Paramount argued
that its all-cash tender offer threatened Time and its shareholders
only if the value of its offer was clearly inferior to the estimated
92
long-term wealth enhancement from the Warner merger.
The Delaware Supreme Court rejected this argument and overForbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see supra note 42. The shareholder
plaintiffs in Paramount argued that the original Time-Warner merger agreement of
March 24, 1989, effectively put Time up for sale, thus invoking Revlon duties. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1149. This argument was based on two facts: (1) Warner shareholders received 62% of the combined company, and (2) statements by Time's directors that
the market might perceive that Time was up for sale indicated the directors' subjective
intent to sell the company. Id.
The court held that the record contained insufficient evidence to conclude that the
Warner negotiations made the break-up of Time inevitable. Id. at 1151. The court explained that Revlon duties attach to a transaction in only two situations: (1) "when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company," or (2) when "in response to a
bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-up of the company." Id. at 1150. The court held that it would
not "extend Revlon's application to corporate transactions simply because they might be
construed as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale.' " Id. at 1151.
88. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152. The court considered the following evidence in
Time's favor: (1) Time decided to move into the entertainment industry as early as 1983;
(2) the board examined the field of all available entertainment companies; (3) the board
determined that Warner was the best "fit" for Time to achieve its strategic objectives; and
(4) Time's board was zealous in seeking to preserve its corporate culture and journalistic
integrity. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch.
1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986)).
92. Id.
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ruled the cases upon which it was based.9 3 The court stated that
Paramount's argument represented a fundamental misunderstanding of the Delaware standard of review.9 4 According to the court,
Paramount's argument assumed that a tender offer could pose only
the two types of threats discussed in Interco: coercive tender offers
and tender offers of inadequate value.95 The court disapproved of
this "narrow and rigid construction of Unocal.' ' 96 Rather, the
court stated that Paramount's tender offer posed another type of
97
threat.
Time argued that the threat posed by the Paramount offer was
that Time's shareholders could be tricked into selling out for cash
when they would be better off becoming stockholders in the new
Time-Warner.98 This type .of threat is called "substantive coercion."' 99 The court deferred to the directors' definition of threat by
invoking the business judgment rule. 100
After legitimizing this new threat, the court examined whether
Time's defensive response of restructuring the deal was reasonable
in relation to that threat. Paramount argued that the restructured
deal was unreasonable because it precluded Time's shareholders
from accepting the tender offer or receiving a control premium in
the immediately foreseeable future.°10 The court rejected this argument, focusing instead on the power of corporate governance.10 2
The court stated that a company's board of directors has the power
to manage the corporate enterprise,1 0 3 including the selection of a
93. Id. at 1153. For an interesting discussion of the history behind this ruling, and
the Delaware Supreme Court's burning desire to overrule Interco and its progeny, see
Meyers, supra note 2.
94. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. This threat was defined by the court as the possibility that "Time shareholders might elect to tender into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance or mistaken belief of
the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce." Id.
99. Id. at 1153 n.17 (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 267). Gilson &
Kraakman define substantive coercion as the "risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic value." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 267.
100. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153.
101. Id. at 1154. Paramount's tender offer was effective only if the Time-Warner
merger agreement were terminated. Id. at 1147. Time's shareholders could have stopped
the merger under the original plan by not approving the issuance of the new shares. The
deal, however, was restructured to take this power away from the shareholders. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1987).

1990]

Taking the Teeth Out of Proportionality Review

time frame for achievement of corporate goals.""' Also, the court
stated that the board has no per se duty to maximize short-term
shareholder wealth. 0 5 A board's decision to forego a short-term
profit in favor of future wealth maximization is unreasonable only
0 6
if there is no clear basis for sustaining the corporate strategy.
Thus, the court found that the directors' response was reasonable
in relation to the threat posed by the Paramount offer and refused
to disturb the Time-Warner merger.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Proportionality review emerged in response to the blanket protection of defensive measures under the standard of review developed in Cheff.10 7 In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized that such automatic approval of defensive actions is not
in the best interests of shareholders. The court in Unocal stated
that there is an "omnipresent specter" of impropriety when a
board implements a takeover defense arising from incumbent
man°8
agement's desire to retain control of the company.
In attempting to develop a tougher standard of review, the Delaware Supreme Court encountered a doctrinal roadblock. Judicial
restraint is a fundamental principle of Delaware corporation law.
To counteract the problems of Cheff, the court was forced to develop a more active standard contrary to its fundamental philosophy of judicial restraint. Accordingly, the court developed
proportionality review. This standard is more stringent than the
Cheff standard because it allows the court to evaluate the reasonableness of a board's defensive response in relation to a posed threat
before the court will grant the protection of the business judgment
rule. This standard subjects a defensive measure to limited scrutiny, and concurrently respects judicial restraint in that it prohibits
the court from evaluating the merits of a board's decision. Thus,
the standard is truly intermediate and provides an effective way for
the court to distinguish takeover defenses that are beneficial to
shareholders from those designed to entrench incumbent
management.
Proportionality review asks reviewing courts to walk a fine line
104. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1154.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); see supra notes 1826 and accompanying text.
108. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); see supra
notes 26-40 and accompanying text.
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between judicial restraint and judicial activism. In Paramount,
however, the court crossed both sides of this line and reduced proportionality review to a rhetorical justification of takeover defenses. The court accomplished this result by redefining the types
of legitimate Unocal threats, by applying the business judgment
rule at the threshold level, and by ignoring shareholders' rights to
choose their own fate.
A.

Redefining the Unocal Threats

For proportionality review to be truly an intermediate standard
of review, the Delaware Supreme Court needed to identify the nature of all permissible threats and establish the boundaries for permissible defensive tactics. 09 Such standards would guide the court
in the future while guarding against judicial second-guessing of
board decisions. In Interco, the Delaware Court of Chancery defined two broad categories of threats posed by tender offers: (1)
threats to voluntariness, and (2) threats from inadequate but noncoercive offers. 110 Paramount rejected this approach as "not in
keeping with a proper Unocal analysis" and a "fundamental misconception" of Unocal."' If anyone has a misunderstanding of
Unocal, however, it appears to be the Delaware Supreme Court.
In a footnote following the discussion of the two Interco threats,
the Paramountcourt stated that commentators have suggested that
there are not two, but three, types of Unocal threats.I 2 Quoting an
article by Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman,1 3 the
court classified the three types of threats as: (1) opportunity loss,
114 (2) structural coercion,"I and (3) substantive coercion. 6
True,
109. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 266.
110. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. 1988); see supra
notes 43-57 and accompanying text.
111. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. Ch.
1989).
112. Id. n.17.
113. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5.
114. Opportunity loss is the threat that the hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select management's superior alternative. Paramount, 571
A.2d at 1153 n.17 (citing Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 267). This threat was
recognized in Interco as the threat from noncoercive but inadequate offers. See supra
note 50 and accompanying text.
115. Structural coercion is the garden variety coercive tender offer recognized in Interco. See supra note 50 and accompanying text; see also, Gilson & Kraakman, supra
note 5, at 267 (structural coercion is "the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering
shareholders might distort shareholders' tender decisions").
116. Substantive coercion is the "risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an
underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representation of intrinsic
value." Gilson & Kraakman, supra, note 5, at 267.
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the court's only mention of the term "substantive coercion" was in
a footnote. Nevertheless, the underlying principle of the new
threat created in Paramountwas essentially a threat of substantive
coercion. The court defined the threat to Time's shareholders as
the danger of "tender[ing] into Paramount's cash offer in ignorance
or a mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might produce." 17 The court adopted this

new threat without the label of substantive coercion and thus obliquely legitimized substantive coercion as a valid Unocal threat.
The court was apparently persuaded by Professors Gilson and
Kraakman's suggestion that the recognition of substantive coercion "would help guarantee that the Unocal standard becomes an
effective intermediate standard of review. ' 18 The court, however,
failed to explain or adhere to the authors' rationale for such a statement. Professors Gilson and Kraakman clearly explained that recognizing substantive coercion can lead to a meaningful standard of
review only if the reviewing court examines "how and when management expects a target's shareholders to do better."" 9 This standard requires more intervention by the reviewing court as well as
target management.' 2 ° Obviously, substantive coercion enhances
the Unocal analysis only if the court takes a more active role in the
reviewing process. Such activism exceeds the scope of proportionality review and forces the court to evaluate the merits of the
board's decision. Ironically, the court instead used substantive coercion to create a more deferential standard of review.
B. Applying the Business Judgment Rule at the Threshold Level
The Delaware Supreme Court avoided evaluating the merits of
Time's restructured merger plan by relying on the restraints of the
business judgment rule. Time's directors defined a substantive coercion threat. The court deferred to the directors' judgment,
claiming that the business judgment rule prohibited the court
"from engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of a long-term versus short-term investment
goal for shareholders."'' Thus, the court adopted a type of threat
that requires the most judicial intervention, but took a very passive
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Paramount,571 A.2d at 1153.
Id. n.17 (citing Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 267).
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 268.
Id.
Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153.
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position under the guise of increasing the effectiveness of proportionality review.
The fundamental flaw in this opinion was mixing the business
judgment rule into the threshold Unocal test. Proportionality review emerged as a threshold test to determine whether a board's
defensive decision should be protected by the business judgment
rule. This test must be passed "before the protection of the business judgment rule can be conferred."' 22 In Paramount, the court
applied the business judgment rule at the threshold level to help
the directors pass the test and gain the protection of the business
judgment rule. Such an analysis makes a mockery of proportionality review. The court used the business judgment rule in determining whether the directors actions should be protected by the
business judgment rule. The court could have been more deferential only if it had let Time's directors write the opinion themselves.
Such a result is contrary to Unocal's concern about directors acting
in their own interest when invoking a takeover defense.' 23
C.

Substantive Coercion PrecludesShareholder Choice

The threat of substantive coercion exists only if shareholders
eventually receive greater value from the continuing entity than
they would have received by tendering their shares to the acquirer.
Unfortunately, stockholders rarely benefit when a company successfully defeats a takeover attempt. 2 4 Even if a company eventually does provide a greater benefit to its shareholders after a
successful takeover defense, Paramount incorrectly overlooks the
shareholders' role in choosing their own fate. Former Delaware
Supreme Court Justice William Duffy stated that it is a fundamental rule of corporate governance and democracy that the corporation is owned by its stockholders and the board has a fiduciary
duty to act on behalf of the shareholders. 25 In Paramount, the
board was controlling the shareholders rather than the shareholders controlling the board. If the board is allowed to enact programs for the specific and stated purpose of precluding
shareholders from making a decision contrary to the board's deci122. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
123. Id.
124. See Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Tender Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 277 (1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge, 28 J.L. & ECON. 151 (1985). But see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Courtroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1980).
125. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1988);
see supra text accompanying note 63.
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sion, then it is impossible to say that the board is acting on behalf
of the shareholders.
V.

IMPACT

The immediate effect of the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in Paramountwas to deprive Time's shareholders of the opportunity to sell their stock for $200 per share. Time restructured its
merger agreement to preclude its shareholders from choosing the
Paramount offer and realizing a $74 per share premium over the
market price. In restructuring the deal, Time incurred seven to ten
billion dollars of debt.126 Time's investment bankers predicted that
by the end of 1990, Time's stock would be trading in the $133 to
$213 range, and that by 1993 these shares should be trading between $320 and $380.127 Based on the current values of the stock
and the company's28 incredible debt structure, those predictions
seem unattainable.

Paramount'sbroader effect is its disruption of the purpose underlying proportionality review. Proportionality review was
adopted to unravel the blanket protection of takeover defenses provided by the Cheff decision. 129 In Unocal, the court recognized
that "[a] corporation does not have unbridled discretion to defeat
any perceived threat by any Draconian means available."'' 30 In
Paramount, however, the court gave Time's directors the discretion to defeat Paramount's bid by incurring seven to ten billion
dollars of debt. This was a Draconian response. By allowing directors such freedom, the Delaware Supreme Court returned to the
Cheff policy that granted directors unfettered discretion to defeat
any takeover attempt. After Paramount, incumbent management
can prevent a court from disturbing its defensive tactics merely by
claiming that implementing the board's stated goals will maximize
126. See supra text accompanying note 80.
127. Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1990, at A19, col. 4.
128. For the second quarter of 1990, Time-Warner posted a $189 million loss after
interest payments and dividends. Id. July 24, 1990, at B3, col. 5. Time-Warner's stock
bottomed out at 65 1/8 in October 1990. The price, however, has rallied recently amid
news that Time-Warner is soliciting companies in hopes of forming, in the words of
Time-Warner chairman and chief executive officer Steven J. Ross: "strategic alliances."
Id. Nov. 30, 1990, at AI, col. 1. It is not difficult to see that "strategic alliances" is, in
fact, a clever euphimism for Time-Warner's desire to unload some of its debt. Perhaps
not so ironically, Paramount, which is still cash rich and seeking aquisitions, has been
mentioned as a potential partner for Time-Warner's startegic alliances. Id. at col.2.
129. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); see supra notes 1826 and accompanying text.
130. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see supra
text accompanying note 40.
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shareholder wealth. Such a claim is similar to the easily documented policy conflict allegation formerly used to invoke the business judgment rule under Cheff. The court's functional return to
Cheff is unfortunate. Under Paramount, defensive decisions are
virtually immune from court challenge.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of proportionality review is to allow a court to distinguish takeover defenses implemented to benefit shareholders
from defenses implemented to entrench incumbent management.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court reduced this standard of review to a rhetorical justification of all takeover defenses, even those implemented for directors' self-serving purposes.
The biggest blow to the effectiveness of the proportionality re'iew standard was the Paramount court's adoption and misappli,cation of the threat of substantive coercion. Additionally, the
court created an extremely deferential standard by applying the
business judgment rule at the threshold level of analysis. Finally,
the court ignored the shareholders' interest in freedom of choice
and inverted the power relationship between shareholders and
directors.
The immediate effects of this decision were to preclude Time's
shareholders from accepting a large control premium and force
them to retain ownership in a corporation of questionable profitability. The broader implication of the decision is its chilling effect
on takeovers, even those that benefit shareholders.
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